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Copy 7 of 7
23 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Liaison Visit to EUCOM/USAREUR/USAFE/NAVEUR to coordinate
"Tactical Needs" Input to Annex E of the NIPS

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1. A draft of Annex E to the National Imagery Plan for Satellites (NIPS) was forwarded to EUCOM and the component commands for review two weeks prior to conferring with [REDACTED] USN, of the IC Staff, and the DoD escort, [REDACTED] (DIA/DC-5). The purpose of this coordination was twofold: (1) to assure the commands fully understood the purpose of Annex E; and (2) to assure that we in the Washington arena had digested and completely understood their stated requirements, and then accurately stated these requirements in the draft annex. Meetings were held at each command and were attended by staff members from the Operations and Planning branches (as well as the Intelligence branch) of each command.

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2. Though advanced information on the [REDACTED] had been provided by 25X1 the DoD, the majority of staff members had only a vague idea of the system capabilities and limitations. The first half of each meeting was devoted to discussing the [REDACTED] in order to establish a base from which discussions could begin. (This is not to be construed as a derogatory statement by any means for these staff members were from the operational branches of their commands. They are, therefore, concentrating on the immediate problems and command concerns--real-world indications and warning, readiness, actions and reactions, etc.) These preliminary discussions were deemed most helpful and extremely beneficial to the staff members and their superiors--the people we need to talk with in planning.

3. All commands stressed five areas of concern and need. They are:

- a. [REDACTED] 25X1
- b. Timeliness of tasking as well as timeliness of data delivery.
- c. Classification of imagery or imagery-derived data.

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
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e. Feedback on tasking status.


Discussion:



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b. Timeliness of Tasking/Data Receipt: The stress of Annex E in this area was primarily pointed toward receipt of imagery data by the user. Discussions with the European commands exposed a problem area in tasking any [redacted]. The complex and zig-zag path a requirement must follow defeats any [redacted] before it even receives a task. The diagram below illustrates SIXTH FLEET tasking route.

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This is a DoD problem! However, if the full capability of any [redacted] national system is to be realized, we must assist DoD in any way possible. Additionally, FICLANT in Norfolk is responsible for PI support to NAVEUR; however, DDP is presently scheduled to provide only Atlantic data on that link and European and Middle East data on the EUCOM link. There is a disconnect.



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25X1 c. Classification: Every command repeatedly stressed that the TK classification was seriously hampering effective utilization of imagery data today. When a [] system would be available, classification would become a very serious detriment to operational use. The problem is not only the viewing of a photo by the combat pilot, but the time lost by administrative security procedures that must be followed in accordance with present instructions. Without exception, the commands stated that they did not need to know, nor desired to know, the source of [] 25X1 data. The community needs to look at this problem from the bottom up and remedy the problem quickly.

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25X1 e. Feedback on Tasking Status: Once a requirement is stated up the chain of command, the initiator usually does not know if the task has been levied and, if levied, was it approved and scheduled by COMIREX or SORS. COM6thFLT has outstanding requirements that have never been acknowledged. A USAFE general officer has stated that national systems have never met his needs, and he has no confidence that they will ever meet a tactical commander's needs. A system needs to be implemented that will inform the requester that his requirement will or will not result in a tasking; also, when the system will be tasked and when he can expect the data. The command can then apply his own assets to fill the gaps or cover the initial requirement. In areas that are accessible to theatre assets, targets are usually covered by both national and organic assets because the command did not know the status of his request.

4. The overall impression I received from this trip is accurately stated in General Graham's memorandum of 13 September 1975, subject, "Poor Understanding of the Role of Military Intelligence". However, it is a two-way street--the command must understand the capabilities, limitations, and policies of national systems. Another area that requires study is how they can help him fill intelligence gaps and extend his area of knowledge beyond his organic assets' range.

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Actions:

a. Assist and coordinate with DoD [] DIA/DC) 25X1
to improve the timeliness and routing of imagery tasking to assure the
effective utilization of a [] (This action item 25X1
is to include SIGINT and HUMINT resources as issues develop and solutions
evolve.)

b. Assist and coordinate with DoD [] DIA/DC-5) 25X1
and ICS [] to meld together the imagery data flow from
the DDP to the military user in the field through intra-theatre transmission.

c. Assist DoD [] DIA/DC) in obtaining a solution 25X1
to the classification problem in the field, and interface with DoD and
COMIREX on a solution to the problem of [] (This
action item is to include SIGINT and HUMINT resources as issues develop
and solutions evolve.)

d. Assist and coordinate with DoD [] DIA/DC) 25X1
and COMIREX-SORS to develop a procedure to inform the originator of
a requirement and the status of tasking.

e. Continue close liaison with commands throughout to understand
more thoroughly their concerns and problems on the working level and
seek solutions regarding national resources support. Many large problems
in the field are viewed as small administrative problems in Washington.

5. It is realized that the majority of the actions listed are DoD problems,
but in order for national systems to be effectively used and credibility established,
I believe the IC Staff should assist DoD working levels as much as possible. Unless
otherwise directed, I will proceed with the above actions.

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